University of New Haven

Digital Commons @ New Haven
Finance Faculty Publications

Finance

2017

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Options,
Opportunities and Alternatives
James Mohs
University of New Haven, jmohs@newhaven.edu

Martin Goldberg
University of New Haven

David Palacio Buitrago
Coca Cola North America

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.newhaven.edu/finance-facpubs
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Publisher Citation
Mohs, James, Goldberg, Martin, Buitrago, David (2017). Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Options, Opportunities and Alternatives,
International Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 5(1), 10-21.

Comments
(C) 2017 by the Authors. This article appeared in International Journal of Accounting and Taxation.

International Journal of Accounting and Taxation
June 2017, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 10-21
ISSN: 2372-4978 (Print), 2372-4986 (Online)
Copyright © The Author(s). All Rights Reserved.
Published by American Research Institute for Policy Development
DOI: 10.15640/ijat.v5n1a2
URL: https://doi.org/10.15640/ijat.v5n1a2

Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Options, Opportunities and Alternatives
Dr. James N. Mohs1, Martin A. Goldberg J.D, LL.M.2
David Palacio Buitrago MST3
Abstract
Base erosion and profit shifting is generally defined as tax strategies that serve to
exploit gaps or inconsistencies in global tax systems that allow an enterprise to shift
profits to lower tax jurisdictions. This can be accomplished by either shifting
income to lower tax jurisdiction or shifting deductible expenses to higher tax
jurisdictions. Historically, these shifting strategies have been handled on a country
by country basis with no centralized framework. In 2015 the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development proposed modifications through its Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting project that if adopted by the member countries, would
reverse the adverse impact to the global tax system caused by shifting profits and
assets among members of controlled groups. By reviewing the major tax shifting
strategies as well as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
proposals to curb any perceived abuses, this research will serve to fill a gap in the
literature surrounding Base Erosion and Profit Shifting strategies. The conclusions
and recommendations reached in the paper are generalizable and appropriate for use
in developing best practice solutions.
Keywords: Transfer Pricing, Interest stripping, Supportive expenses & OECD

1. Introduction
Base erosion typically occurs when multinational organizations engage in
cross-border transactions that will shift income, expenses or assets from one tax
jurisdiction to another.
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The tax strategies employed to reduce an organizations overall tax burden give
rise to a zero-sum game at the jurisdictional or county level, where one country will
lose tax revenues and another will gain revenues. The overall tax shifting strategy is
referred to as Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). Mohs, Goldberg, Butler and
Heath (2016) noted that international tax strategies have been around since the
inception of the United States Tax Code due in part to a distinctive feature relating to
the taxation of worldwide income.
There are many different tax strategies that are employed by multi-national
organizations to reduce their overall tax burden. The three predominate strategies
which are addressed in this study center around transfer pricing, interest stripping and
supportive expenses. In an effort to curb any limit base erosion and prevent abuses, as
discussed below, we look to the section of the Internal Revenue Code which
addresses BEPS issues.
2. Background
The primary provision of U.S. income taxation law that addresses BEPS issues
is Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) sec. 482, titled, “Allocation of income and
deductions among taxpayers,” a section that is only two sentences long. The first of
these states:
“In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, theSecretary
may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances
between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary inorder to prevent evasion
of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.”
This language does not explicitly target transactions between businesses in two
different countries. However, the potential for abuse is high where there are two
business entities that are commonly owned or controlled, one in a country where the
net income of a business entity will be taxed at a relatively high rate, and another in a
country where the net income of a business entity will be taxed at a relatively low rate.
Although the abuse targeted by this language can appear in many different variations
and forms, we advance the following example as an illustration;
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Consider, there are two entities that are commonly controlled, one in a hightax jurisdiction and one in a low-tax jurisdiction. As a result of a business
arrangement between them. The transaction could be a loan, a lease, a sale, a license,
or the performance of services. In this transaction, there is money owed from the
entity in the high-tax jurisdiction to the entity in the low-tax jurisdiction. Increasing
the amount of this payment decreases the taxable income of the entity in the high-tax
jurisdiction, at the cost of only a commensurate increase in the taxable income of the
entity in the low-tax jurisdiction. Since the entities are commonly controlled, they
may be motivated more by a desire to minimize overall taxes than to create an
arrangement that is fair for either of the two entities. Thus, the payments could be
artificially inflated to reach the desired combined tax result. If the entity receiving the
payments were in the high-tax jurisdiction, the payments could be artificially low this
would have the effect of keeping the taxable income in the high-tax jurisdiction as low
as possible.The goal of Code sec. 482 is to keep this from happening. The
reallocation authorized by that section would have the effect of making sure, that for
tax purposes, the entities will be treated as having made a fair payment in terms of
specific types of transactions enumerated below:
Transfer Pricing
As noted in Rainish, Mensz and Mohs (2015) transfer prices are broadly
defined as the amounts charged for goods and services exchanged between divisions
or units of the same company. Additionally, Transfer pricing provides the vehicle for
multinational firms to shift profits from high tax jurisdictions to lower tax
jurisdictions. This effectively reduces the tax burden which in effect increases value by
increasing overall profitability and value (Adams and Dirtina, 2010). The universally
accepted approach for setting a transfer price is referred to as the arms-length
standard. The arms-length pricing standard reflects the price at which two unrelated
parties agree to execute a transaction in an open market transaction. The arms-length
standard is based on the notion of comparables. Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code and the regulations promulgated there under provide in part for the
computation of comparables. The notion of comparables is that related party pricing
should equal to open market pricing.
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Mutti and Grubert (2004) argued that despite the fact that countries
worldwide use the arms-length standard to set transfer prices, they often enact rules
that can lead to different interpretations of what the price or the standard would be.
Therefore, it can be concluded that meeting the rules of one country does not
guarantee that the other countries requirements will be met. In an effort to counter
the inconsistencies the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) member countries embarked on numerous studies relating to the various
aspects of base erosion (see OECD A-J, 2015). Included in the transfer pricing would
be rent and sale of tangible and intangible property between members of a controlled
group as reviewed below.
Rent of Tangible Property, Sale of Tangible Property, and Payment for
Services
One type of issue that may be the cause of a BEPS problem would be the
charging of rent by one business for the use of property by a commonly-controlled
entity. Undercharging rent would overstate the income of the lessee, overcharging
rent would understate the income of the lessee. So, if a business in a high-tax
jurisdiction overpaid rent to a commonly-controlled entity in a low-tax jurisdiction,
this would artificially reduce the overall taxes paid by the two businesses.
This problem is specifically addressed by the regulations. Treas. Reg. sec.
1.482-2(c)(1) requires that there be an “arm’s length rental charge” in order to avoid a
reallocation under IRC sec. 482. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-2(c)(2) defines that as;“…the
amount of rent which was charged, or would have been charged for the use of the
same or similar property, during the time it was in use, in independent transactions
with or between unrelated parties. Under similar circumstances considering the period
and location of the use, the owner's investment in the property or rent paid for the
property, expenses ofmaintaining the property, the type of property involved, its
condition, and all other relevant facts.”
A similar rule will apply to the sale of tangible property. Underlying all these
principles is an assumption that the property will in fact have an ascertainable arm’s
length rental value. In order to avoid any problems, there is a procedure available by
which a corporation can enter into an agreement with the Internal Revenue Service,
called the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement (APMA) program. A revised
procedure, in part reflecting some of the considerations of OECD’s BEPS project,
was issued on August 12, 2015 in Rev. Proc. 2015-40.
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Intangible Property
The discussion of Code sec. 482 so far has been of the first sentence, and the
regulations relative to that sentence. The second sentence of Code sec. 482 addresses
a very specific issue, stating:
“In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property (within the
meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or license
shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.”
Although the words “intangible property” can have a much broader meaning,
in this case the words are as defined in Code sec. 936(h)(3)(B), which states:
“The term “intangible property” means any—
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

Patent, invention, formula, process, design, pattern, or know-how
Copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition
Trademark, trade name, or brand name
Franchise, license, or contract;
Method, program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast,
estimate, customer list, or technical data; or
vi. Any similar item, which has substantial value independent of the services of any
individual.”
For these purposes the term, “intangible property” has a definition more
closely related to what one would think of as intellectual property. A great deal of
abuse in the BEPS area arises from intellectual property. Perhaps even more so than
executive services, intellectual property is unique. It is more difficult to establish both
a fair market value for an intangible asset as well as an arm’s-length licensing fee, and
that uncertainty makes it susceptible to BEPS abuse. Thus, one entity can transfer the
property to another claiming a low value, and then license the property back for a
disproportionately large amount. As with services, the regulations provide multiple
ways of calculating the amount to be charged for the sale or licensing of intangible
property.
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These are based on the profit generated by the intangible property, which in
all events will be more susceptible of calculation than the profits generated by
services. So, the rules applicable to intangible property will be more predictable and
reliable than those related to services, at least with regard to executive and specialized
services. The regulations applicable to intangible property can be found at Treas. Reg.
1.482-4.
Interest Stripping
The payment of deductible interest is one of the ways that net income can be
shifted from one entity to another, and there are two issues at play here. The first
issue is that, where there is interest paid on a loan or advance from one member of a
group of controlled entities to another, the amount of that interest may be adjusted
for tax purposes under IRC sec. 482 if the creditor “…either charges no interest, or
charges interest at a rate which is not equal to an arm's length rate of interest…”
Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-2(a)(1)(i).
The second issue is that, whether or not the interest rate is arm’s length, the
amount charged will only be respected for tax purposes if there is a bona fide
indebtedness. A bona fide indebtedness can arise out of “Loans or advances of
money or other consideration…” or “Indebtedness arising in the ordinary course of
business from sales, leases, or the rendition of services by or between members of the
group, or any other similar extension of credit.” Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-2(a)(1)(ii)(A).
However, even an arm’s length rate of interest will be not be respected to the
extent it is paid on “…an alleged indebtedness which is not in fact a bona fide
indebtedness…” Examples of alleged indebtedness which is not bona fide
indebtedness are those based on payments which are contributions to the capital or a
corporation, distributions from corporations to shareholders, or consideration for an
alleged sale between controlled entities which is really a lease. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.4822(a)(1)(ii)(B).
To the extent that the regulations may treat alleged indebtedness as
contributions to the capital of a corporation, they echo Code sec. 385. The general
rule of that section is “The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary or appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is
to be treated for purposes of this title as stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and
in part indebtedness).” Code sec. 385(a)
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It is not at all difficult to imagine a scenario where a payment from a
shareholder to a corporation, which the corporation would treat as a loan on which
interest payments would be deductible, to be recharacterized as a contribution to the
capital of the corporation, resulting in the purported interest payments being treated
as non-deductible distributions. This could be the result under either Code sec. 385(a)
or Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-2(a)(1)(ii)(B). The difference is that Code sec. 385 only
operates to the extent of regulations, which at the present time are not as broad as the
regulations under Code sec. 482.
Even though Code sec. 385 was enacted in 1969, the only regulation
promulgated under it were finalized just recently, on October 21, 2016. These
regulations were still limited in that they applied only to debt issued by domestic
corporations in certain narrow circumstances, such as debt issued as part of the
acquisition of a related corporation. As noted in Mohs et al (2106) Code sec. 482 and
the regulations promulgated there under, transnational shifting of taxable income was
not explicitly the object of the Code sec. 385 regulations, but it clearly was an
intended target
But there are also common law principles broader than the current narrow
reach of Code sec. 385 regulations. The Tax Court has recharacterized purported
debt as equity, in order to disallow deduction of payments characterized by the
taxpayer as interest.
In making such a recharacterization the Tax Court cited factors such as
“…presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; source of payments; right to enforce
payments; participation in management as a result of the advances; status of the
advances in relation to regular corporate creditors; intent of the parties; identity of
interest between creditor and stockholder; "thinness" of capital structure in relation to
debt; ability of corporation to obtain credit from outside sources; use to which
advances were put; failure of debtor to repay; and risk involved in making advances.”
Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, (1980).
In short, then, interest payments used for profit shifting can be challenged
until multiple fronts under U.S. tax law: Deductibility of interest can be challenged
under Code sec. 482 and its regulations, both in terms of the amount that can be
deductible and in terms of whether the debt will be challenged as being bona fide.
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Code sec. 385 and its regulations also provide a means for recharacterizing
debt as equity, where they apply. Finally, there is common law that could be used to
recharacterize debt as equity, which would also have the effect of denying a deduction
for amounts purported to be interest payments.
Supportive Expenses
Supportive or stewardship expenses are generally defined as those expenses
that are incurred for activities undertaken by the parent corporation as an investment
in a wholly owned subsidiary. IRC section 861 and specifically Treasury Reg. 1-861-8
provides in part for the allocation of those expenses to the class of income that
includes dividends from the subsidiary. Apportioning deductions between the parent
and subsidiary is often problematic. In a completely domestic relationship,
apportioning can be accomplished using a base that reflects, to a reasonable close
extent, the factual relationship between deduction and the gross income. Domestic to
domestic apportionments can include but are not be limited to gross income, gross
receipts, expenses incurred, assets employed or any cost driver approximates a cost
factual relationship. International apportionments are much more complex and the
existing guidance is nebulous at best. Rodriquez (2001) argued that “the Section 861
regulations state no preference for volume-based drivers over any others, so the
distinction is irrelevant.”
An additional argument raised was that “there is no careful optimization
calculus at the conclusion of 861 studies based on the ABC analysis, only a
realignment of income based on more advantageous matching of expenses to
income.”However, these methods depend on there being extrinsic measures that can
be used to value services. Goldberg, Wnek and Pineau (2012)noted that missing from
the listed methods is a way to value specialized and extraordinary services, such as
executive services, as these are unique and not susceptible to valuation by external
criteria. A more troublesome issue arises with regard to services. Payment for
services, like interest payments or payments for the purchase or use of property, can
be manipulated in order to reach a desired tax result. Regulations promulgated under
Code sec. 482 examine payment for services in extensive detail, outlining seven
different ways that services can be valued for purposes of avoiding a recalculation
under Code sec. 482. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.482-9(a)(1) -(7)
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3. Organization Of Economic Cooperation And Development Centrtalized
Framework
The continued growth of cross-border transactions and the politicized issue of
base erosion and profit shifting has become a major challenge in the area of
international taxation. The OECD has attempted to answer the question of how
might policies be changed to combat base erosion and profit shifting in its base
erosion and project shifting (BEPS) project, but the complexity of the issues
addressed and the short time period allocated to this project resulted in a vague and
seemingly incomplete result. Additional research and data collection would be
necessary to address the main issue. Cooperation between multinational organizations
and governments is a major requirement and hurdle to creating a concrete system to
handle the complex transactions used to erode an income base and shift profits. The
project was divided into fifteen (15) action items and categorized into three categories:
Substantive Actions, Coherence Actions, and Transparency Actions.
Substantive Actions
The first area of the BEPS project is the substantive category. The group of
actions in the substance category is dedicated to addressing. The aligning of taxing
rights with value-adding activity. The action items here are Preventing Treaty Abuse,
Artificial Avoidance and Permanent Establishment, and Transfer Pricing.
Coherence Actions
The second area of the BEPS project is the coherence category. The action
items in the coherence category are dedicated to addressing the cohesiveness of the
international tax system. The areas are hybrid mismatch arrangements, interest
deductions and other payments, and controlled foreign company rules.
Transparency Actions
The third category area of the BEPS project is the transparency category. The
group of actions in the transparency category is dedicated to addressing the
transparency of transactions performed by multinational enterprises.
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This area is dedicated to reporting on transfer pricing documentation,
measuring and monitoring BEPS, disclosure of aggressive tax planning arrangements
and economic digitalization. This section will focus on the areas of Transfer Pricing
Documentation and the Digital Economy.
4. Conclusion
Base erosion typically occurs when multinational organizations engage in
cross-border transactions that will shift income or expenses from one tax jurisdiction
to another. The tax strategies employed to reduce an organizations overall tax burden
give rise to a zero-sum game at the jurisdictional or county level, where one country
will lose tax revenues and another will gain revenues. International tax strategies have
been around since the inception of the United States Tax Code due in part to a
distinctive feature relating to the taxation of worldwide income.The continued growth
of cross-border transactions and the politicized issue of base erosion and profit
shifting has become a major challenge in the area of international taxation. The
OECD has attempted to answer the question of how might policies be changed to
combat base erosion and profit shifting in its base erosion and project shifting (BEPS)
project, but the complexity of the issues addressed and the short time period allocated
to this project resulted in a vague and seemingly incomplete result.
Additional research and data collection would be necessary to address the
main issue. Cooperation between multinational organizations and governments is a
major requirement and hurdle to creating a concrete system to handle the complex
transactions used to erode an income base and shift profits.
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